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Abstract—This paper presents a concrete and widespread example of situation where a user’s location privacy is unintentionally
compromised by others, specifically the location-privacy threat that exists at access points (public hotspots, FON, home routers,
etc.) that have a single public IP and make use of network address translation (NAT). As users connected to the same hotspot
share a unique public IP address, a single user’s making a location-based request is enough to enable a service provider to map
the IP address of the hotspot to its geographic coordinates, thus compromising the location privacy of all the other connected
users. When successful, the service provider can locate users within a few hundreds of meters, thus improving over existing
IP-location databases. Even in the case where IPs change periodically (e.g., by using DHCP), the service provider is still able to
update a previous (IP, Location) mapping by inferring IP changes from authenticated communications (e.g., cookies).
The contribution of this paper is three-fold: (i) We identify a novel location-privacy threat caused by shared public IPs in
combination with NAT. (ii) We formalize and analyze the threat theoretically. In particular we derive and provide expressions
of the probability that the service provider will learn the mapping and of the expected proportion of victims. (iii) We experimentally
assess the state in practice by using real traces (collected from deployed hotspots over a period of 23 days) of users who
accessed Google services. We also discuss how existing countermeasures can thwart the threat.
Index Terms—Location Privacy; Network Address Translation (NAT); IP-Geolocation
F
1 INTRODUCTION
A S mobile users benefit from online services whileon the go, location information has become
mainstream. On the one hand, by providing their loca-
tion with so-called location-based services (LBS), users
can enjoy context-aware features, such as finding
nearby restaurants, and social features, such as shar-
ing location information with their friends on social
networks [2]. Although very convenient, the usage of
LBS raises serious privacy issues, because much sensi-
tive information can be inferred from users’ locations,
including users’ movements and associated activities.
On the other hand, location information has become
essential for many online service providers [3], es-
pecially for those whose business models revolve
around personalized services. A prominent example
is (mobile) online advertising, an ever-increasing busi-
ness whose worldwide annual revenue is in the tens
of billions of US Dollars [4], as location-specific ads
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have become significantly more appealing to users [5].
Even if users do not willingly disclose their loca-
tion to the service provider (typically a non-LBS ser-
vice provider), the service can obtain users’ locations
through IP-location, i.e., determining the location of a
device from its IP. Existing IP-location services rely
either on (i) active techniques, typically based on net-
work measurements [6], [7], or (ii) passive techniques,
relying on databases with records of IP-location map-
pings [8], [9]. Active techniques provide more accurate
results than passive ones, however, they incur high
measurement overhead and a high response time (in
the range of several seconds to several minutes). A
passive approach is several orders of magnitude faster
and, hence preferred by service operators. A number
of IP-location databases are available, either for free
(e.g., HostIP [9]) or commercial (e.g., MaxMind [8]).
They provide a country-level accuracy, and at most
city-level, and most of the entries refer only to a
few countries [10]. For instance, MaxMind reports it
correctly geo-locates, within a radius of 40 km, 81% of
IP addresses in the US and 60%-80% in Europe. This
level of accuracy is only effective for regional adver-
tising but is not sufficient for local businesses (e.g.,
coffee shops) that require neighborhood or street-level
accuracy [5]. Therefore, major web companies, includ-
ing Google, are working on improving IP-location1
by constructing their own IP-location databases. An
1. Google reports an accuracy of 95% at the region-level and 75%
at the city-level, with high variance across countries, and seeks to
improve it to the street-level [11].
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original way for the service providers to obtain a
user’s location is via transitivity by relying on other
users to disclose their location (typically LBS users)
and that of others in their vicinity (typically in a social
network): if a provider knows the location of user B
and that user A is close to user B, the provider knows
roughly the location of A. For instance when users
check-in on online social networks and tag friends who
are with them. Even if the proximity information is
not directly revealed by users, the adversary is still
able to infer this, as we will show in the case of access
points that make use of network address translation.
In this paper, we study a location-privacy threat
users are exposed to on a daily basis. When a user
connects to the Internet through the same access point
(AP) as other users (e.g., a public hotspot, home
router) who make (or made) LBS queries, the ser-
vice provider (the adversary in this paper) learns the
user’s location. Indeed, because the devices connected
to a public hotspot, implementing network address
translation, share the AP’s public IP address, when
users generate LBS queries, the service provider learns
the fine-grained geographic location of the AP and
maps it to the AP’s public IP. IP addresses remain
the same for a certain amount of time, therefore for
any connection for which the source IP is the same
as the AP’s IP, the service provider can conclude that
the device is located nearby the location of the AP.
The accuracy of the estimated location depends on
the range of the AP (typically under one hundred
meters) and on the accuracy of the locations reported
by users in LBS queries (typically under ten meters
with GPS-geolocation). Thus, it is significantly more
accurate than the existing IP-location databases.
Our contribution in this paper is three-fold: (i) We
identify the location-privacy threat that arises from
the use of shared IPs. (ii) We formalize and analyze
the problem and we provide a framework for estimat-
ing the location-privacy threat, namely the probability
of a user being localized by a service provider. The
framework is easily applicable to any access point
setting: it employs our closed-form solution and takes
as input an AP’s parameters (i.e., a few aggregated
parameters that can be extracted from logs), and it
quantifies the potential threat. It is a light-weight al-
ternative to extensive traffic analysis. (iii) We evaluate
experimentally the scale of the threat using real traces
(collected for a period of one month from deployed
hotspots) of users who accessed Google services. Even
at a moderately often visited hotspot, we observe the
large scale of the threat: the service provider, namely
Google, learns the location of the AP only about an
hour after users first connect and within 24 hours it
can locate up to 73% of the users. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper that addresses the
problem of users’ locations being exposed by others at
NAT access points: related works either focus on other
attacks to infer a user’s location or on how sporadic
location exposure can be exploited to track a user or
to infer high-level information about her.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we
provide the relevant background. We describe the
system setting, the adversary and the threat model
in Sec. 3. We formalize the problem by modeling user
behaviors in Sec. 4 and we analytically quantify the
threat by providing closed-form expressions of the
number of victims. We further evaluate the threat
based on traces from deployed access points and
present the results in Sec. 5. In Sec. 6, we consider
possible countermeasures. Further discussion is pre-
sented in Sec. 7. Finally, we conclude in Sec. 8.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide relevant background on the
technical aspects underlying the considered problem.
IPv4 (public) Address Allocation. To communicate
on the Internet, hosts need public IP addresses. An
IP can be either static or dynamic, i.e., periodically
obtained from a pool of available addresses, typically
through the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
(DHCP). The host can use the IP for a limited amount
of time specified by the DHCP lease. For convenience,
upon DHCP lease expiration, hosts are often re-
assigned the same IP. A large-scale study shows that
over the period of one month, less than 1% of the
clients used more than one IP and less than 0.07% of
clients used more than three IP addresses [12].
Network Address Translation (NAT). In order to
cope with IP address depletion, NAT was introduced.
NAT hides an IP address space, usually consisting
of private IPs, behind one or several public IPs. It is
typically used in Local Area Networks (LANs), where
each device has a private IP, including the gateway
router that runs NAT. The router is also connected
to the Internet with a public IP assigned by an ISP.
As traffic is routed from the LAN to the Internet, the
private source IP in each packet is translated on-the-
fly to the public IP of the router: traffic from all of the
hosts in the LAN appears with the same public IP –
the public IP of the NAT router. A study shows that
about 60% of users are behind NATs [12].
Geolocation. Mobile devices determine their positions
by using their embedded GPS or an online geoloca-
tion service. With a GPS unit, the computation takes
place locally by using satellites positions. Commercial
GPS units provide highly accurate location results
(less than ten meters) [13], especially in open sky
environments. With online geolocation services (e.g.,
Skyhook) a device shares the list of nearby cell towers
and Wi-Fi APs, together with their signal strengths,
based on which the server estimates the device lo-
cation by using a reference database. This database
is built typically by deploying GPS-equipped mobile
units that scan for cell towers and Wi-Fi APs and plot
VRATONJIC ET AL.: A LOCATION-PRIVACY THREAT STEMMING FROM THE USE OF SHARED PUBLIC IP ADDRESSES 3
their precise geographic locations. In addition, they
take into account input reported by users with GPS-
equipped devices who provide both their positions
and the surrounding parameters. The accuracy of such
systems is in the range of 10 meters [14].
Note that Skyhook cannot be used by a service
provider to infer users’ locations from their IP. In-
deed, Skyhook provides only APs’ MAC addresses
to location mappings and the service provider does
not know the MAC addresses of a user’s neighboring
APs (not even the MAC address of the AP the user
connects from) unless the user discloses them.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we elaborate on the considered set-
ting, notably NAT access points, the location-privacy
threat, and the adversary.
3.1 Setting
We consider a NAT access point setting, a prevalent
network configuration, where users connect to the
Internet through an access point (AP), such as a public
hotspot or a home (wireless) router, as depicted in
Fig. 1. An AP, located at (x1,y1), is connected to the
Internet and provides connectivity to the users. The
AP has a single dynamic public IP address that is
allocated with DHCP by its Internet provider (from
a given pool of available IPs) and that is valid during
the DHCP lease time. The AP operator has no control
over the way the AP’s IP is assigned by the Internet
provider. The AP implements NAT.
While connected to the Internet through an AP,
users make use of various online services including
search engines, e-mail, social networks, location-based
and online geolocation services. Services can be used
either in an authenticated (e.g., e-mail) or unauthenti-
cated way (e.g., search). We consider that the requests
a server receives are of the following types:
1) Geolocation requests: Geo-Req(MACs), where
MACs refer to the MAC addresses of the APs
and cell towers in the range of the device;
2) LBS requests: LBS-Req(x0, y0), where (x0, y0)
denotes the coordinates of the device2 (assumed
close to the AP’s location (x1, y1));
3) Authenticated standard (i.e., that are neither
Geolocation nor LBS) requests: Auth-Req(tok),
where tok represents any information that al-
lows for user authentication or linkability of user
requests (e.g., a cookie or a username);
4) Unauthenticated standard requests: Req().
With LBS requests, the service provider obtains the
user’s location under several forms and by different
2. We assume that all LBS requests concern users’ actual loca-
tions, or that the server has means to distinguish between such
LBS requests and other LBS requests. This is the case when the
location is obtained directly using the methods described in Sec. 2.
means. The user can specify her position in free-
text (e.g., “bars near Park and 57th, Manhattan”)
or by pin-pointing her position on a map. The lo-
cation can also be determined by the user’s de-
vice (see Sec. 2) and communicated to the service
provider by a mobile app or by her browser through
the geolocation.getCurrentPosition JS func-
tion used by websites. Both Geo-Req and LBS-Req
contain an estimate of the AP’s coordinates, thus they
both enable the server to build the (IP, (x1, y1)) map-
ping. Consequently, there is no need to distinguish
between these two types of requests, and we refer
to both as LBS requests. For all types of request, the
server knows the source IP, i.e., the AP’s public IP.
3.2 Adversary and Threat Models
We consider an adversary whose goal is to learn
users’ current (or past) locations, for instance, to
make a profit by providing geo-targeted (mobile) ads
and recommendations (e.g., a private company). The
adversary has access to the information collected by
a number of servers that provide services described
above. Companies, such as Google, provide web
searches (Google), e-mail (GMail), social networking
(Google+), and geolocation and location-based ser-
vices (Google Maps). As such, Google receives re-
quests of the three types and consolidates all the
information obtained [15]. The extent to which these
services are used is exacerbated by their deep inte-
gration in the widely spread Android operating sys-
tem, which frequently sends the devices’ locations to
Google services3. In addition, Google has an advertis-
ing network and thus has a strong incentive to obtain
and monetize information about users’ locations. As
a matter of fact, Google is working on improving its
IP-location based on users’ traffic, by mining location-
related events (e.g., search queries associated with
location such as “best burgers Manhattan”) [11].
Microsoft (with Bing, Hotmail, Bing Maps, and
Windows Phones) and Apple (with iCloud and
iPhone) are other relevant potential candidates for the
considered adversary. Besides these major companies,
an alliance of service providers can be envisioned to
jointly build an IP-location database: each provider
contributes IP-location records of its visitors with
known locations and benefits from the database for
the IPs of users connecting from unknown locations.
This joint effort can be coordinated by an ad network
that is common to the participating service providers.
This approach extends the potential of the threat as it
increases the set of potential adversaries: it alleviates
the need for each service provider to receive all three
types of requests and a significant fraction of user
traffic. Instead, they can do so through aggregation.
3. Note that mobile phones are less susceptible to the threat
presented in this paper as they often access the Internet over cellular
networks (e.g., 3G/4G) instead of Wi-Fi access points.
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Access Point (AP) 
HTTP Request 
(IP: 82.63.142.34)  
location ??? ??  
public IP: 82.63.142.34 (obtained by DHCP) 
Uses Network Address Translation (NAT) 
Mobile Phone (with GPS) 
private IP: 192.168.1.3 
position: ??? ??  
Web Server 
LBS Request ??? ??  
(IP: 82.63.142.34) 
Mobile Phone 
private IP: 192.168.1.5 
Use mapping: (82.63.142.34) ↔ ??? ??
Location-Based Service 
Build mapping: (82.63.142.34) ↔ ??? ??  
Controlled by the adversary 
4. 
1. 3. 
2. 
Fig. 1. System and threat model. Devices connect through a NAT Access Point. A user who makes an LBS
request reveals her location to the adversary (1) who maps the IP to its location (2). When another user connects
to a different server (3), the adversary uses the mapping to locate her as she connects with the same IP (4).
In this paper, we focus on the case where the
adversary has access to all three types of requests.
The adversary is assumed to be honest-but-curious,
meaning that he passively collects information.
Given such an adversarial model, we consider the
threat of the adversary who learns the location of a
user without it being explicitly disclosed: The threat
comes from the fact that the adversary can build
mappings between the APs’ IPs and their geographic
coordinates based on LBS requests he receives from
other users connected to the APs. Because all requests
(from devices connected through the AP) share the
same public IP, the adversary can subsequently infer
the location of the other users. More specifically, con-
sidering the example depicted in Fig. 1, when the LBS
provider’s server (assumed to be controlled by the ad-
versary) receives an LBS request for position (x0, y0),
which is the actual position of the user (located close
to the AP) determined by her GPS-equipped mobile
phone, the server can map the AP’s public IP (i.e.,
82.63.142.34) to the approximated AP’s location
(i.e., (x1, y1)≈ (x0, y0)). Note that the accuracy of the
AP’s estimated location depends on the accuracy of
the GPS of the user-reported location and the range of
the AP. Later, when another user, connected through
the AP, makes a request to a server (also controlled
by the adversary), then the adversary can exploit
the obtained mapping and infer from the source IP
(i.e., the AP’s public IP again) that the second user
is at the same location (i.e., (x1, y1)). The adversary
can subsequently provide geo-targeted ads. If the
adversary is interested in tracking specific users, he
can locate those who make an authenticated request.
We assume that the IP addresses in the DHCP pool
can be assigned to clients at very distant locations [16].
For instance, some nation-wide ISPs (e.g., SFR in
France) assign IPs among the whole set of their clients
scattered all over the country. Consequently, the fact
that the AP’s public IP is dynamic limits in time
the extent of the threat: If the AP is assigned a new
IP by the ISP, the mapping built by the adversary
becomes invalid, unless the adversary is able to infer
the IP change. The inference can be based on au-
thenticated requests as depicted in Fig. 2: A request,
authenticated by cookie john@dom.com and origi-
nating from IP 82.63.142.34, is shortly followed
by another request authenticated by the same cookie
john@dom.com but originating from a different IP
(i.e., 82.63.140.25). There are two options: either
the AP’s IP has changed or the user has moved and
is now connected from a different AP. If the inference
time interval (delimited with diamonds in Fig. 2)
around the IP renewal time is short enough, then the
adversary can infer, with high confidence, that the IP
has changed and infer its new value.
Summary. The problem we study is as follows. Con-
sidering a single AP, time is divided into intervals
corresponding to DHCP leases, during which the AP’s
public IP address remains the same. At a certain point
in time, the adversary knows the location of the AP
associated to the IP because (i) a user made an LBS
request earlier in the time interval or (ii) the adversary
knew the location corresponding to the public IP
address from the previous interval and a user made
an authenticated request shortly before and after the
public IP address was renewed. The location-privacy
threat is to be evaluated in terms of the number of
users whose locations are known by the adversary.
In the case of geo-targeted mobile ads, the adversary
needs to know the location of the user when the
user makes a requests: the victims are therefore the
users who make a standard request after the adversary
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Fig. 2. AP’s IP renewal and update of the (IP, Location) mapping. A user makes an authenticated request during
a lease in which the adversary learns the mapping, shortly before and after the AP is assigned a new IP. The
adversary infers that the AP’s IP changed from 82.63.142.34 to 82.63.140.25 and updates the mapping.
learns the (IP, Location) mapping (during the same
DHCP lease). If the adversary is interested in tracking
users, he can maintain a log of the users who con-
nected during a DHCP lease and sent requests, and
locate them a posteriori if he learns the (IP, Location)
mapping at some point during the same DHCP lease:
the victims are the users who make an authenticated
request during a DHCP lease in which the adversary
learns the (IP, Location) mapping. Our experimental
evaluation (see Sec. 5), based on a real dataset, shows
that the threat is real: in a typical setting, Google
learns the location of up to 90% of its users without
them explicitly disclosing it.
4 FORMALIZATION AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we model the aforementioned setting
and build a framework to quantify the threat, which
takes only a few parameters as input. The notations
are summarized in Table 1 in the appendix.
4.1 Model
We consider an access point AP, a passive adversary
A, and a set of users who connect to AP and make
requests to servers controlled by A. We study the
system over the continuous time interval [0,+∞). At
each time instant t, AP has a single public IP. Every T
time units, starting at time 0, the DHCP lease expires
and AP is either re-assigned the same IP or allocated
a new one. We model this with independent random
variables drawn from a Bernoulli distribution: with
probability pNew AP is assigned a new IP, and with
probability 1− pNew it is re-assigned the same IP. We
divide time into successive sub-intervals Ik, k ≥ 0,
of duration T , corresponding to the DHCP leases:
Ik = [kT, (k+1)T ], and we conduct a continuous-time
analysis of the system within the sub-intervals. Each
sub-interval is aligned with a DHCP lease. Therefore,
within each sub-interval AP’s public IP remains un-
changed. For any time instant t, we denote by t¯, the
relative time within the corresponding sub-interval,
that is t¯ = t mod T .
Users connect to AP, remain connected for a certain
time and then disconnect. While connected, users
make requests, each of which is of one of the following
types: LBS, authenticated, or standard. All modeling
choices in this section follow well-established con-
ventions [17] – e.g., Poisson processes are known to
fit well users arrival and access to services–and are
backed up by several public Wi-Fi hotspot workload
analysis (e.g., [18]). We model users who arrive and
connect to AP with a homogeneous Poisson process
with intensity λArr, thus the number NArr(t) of users
who connect to AP, during any time interval of length
t, follows a Poisson distribution with parameter λArrt:
P [NArr(t) = n] =
(λArrt)
n
n!
e−λArrt , n ≥ 0.
We denote the time users stay connected to AP by
TDur, which follows an exponential distribution with
average 1λDur . This means that the associated cumula-
tive distribution function (cdf) and probability density
function (pdf) are
fDur(t) = λDure
−λDurt
and
FDur(t) = P [TDur < t] = 1− e−λDurt .
A noteworthy property of exponential distributions is
memorylessness: the probability distribution of the time
spent by a given user at a certain AP since a given
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time instant t, provided that the user is still connected
at time t, is the same for all t. In other words,
∀t,∀δt, P [TDur > δt] = P [TDur > t+ δt | TDur > t].
We assume the system to be stationary in terms of
user connections and disconnections. Based on Little’s
law [17], the average number of connected users at
any time instant t is therefore constant and given by:
NCon = λArr/λDur.
Users generate requests independently of each
other. For each user, the three types of requests she
makes are also independent: Standard and authenti-
cated requests are modeled by independent Poisson
processes with average intensity λStd and λAuth, re-
spectively.4 The probability that at least one request
of a type is made during an interval of length t is
PStd(t) = 1− e−λStdt and PAuth(t) = 1− e−λAutht .
Another noteworthy property of Poisson processes is
that the numbers of requests in two disjoint intervals
are independent. We assume that each user makes a
request when she connects to AP. For instance, an
e-mail or RSS client usually automatically connects
to a server when an Internet connection is available.
We assume that only a proportion αLBS of the users
make LBS requests, and we model such requests
by independent homogeneous Poisson processes with
intensity λLBS for each user.
Fig. 3 depicts the user arrivals, departures, and the
standard and LBS request processes and it illustrates
the key notations and concepts introduced in this
section.
vulnerability window (W )
compromise time (TComp)
t
| |
kT (k + 1)T
A5
Std5
A6
Std6
D1 A7
Std7 Std4 Std6
D4
LBS5
Fig. 3. Threat caused by a user making an LBS
request. Ai and Di represent User i’s arrival and
departure, respectively. Users 1 and 4 are already
present at time kT . The time at which the first LBS
request is made (LBS5) is called the compromise time
(TComp). From time TComp on, any user who makes a
standard request is a victim. Users already connected
at TComp are victims if they make a standard request
after TComp, e.g., User 4. Users who connect after
TComp are, de facto, victims as users make a standard
request when they connect, e.g., User 7.
4. For the sake of clarity, the derivations and expressions pre-
sented in the paper are for homogeneous processes. We did the
derivations for inhomogeneous Poisson processes with piece-wise
constant (over the intervals 1:30AM - 7:30PM - 1:30PM - 7:30PM)
intensities as well, and we included the corresponding graphs.
4.2 Threat
We first focus on a single sub-interval and quantify
the location-privacy threat, in terms of the number of
users whose locations are disclosed to the adversary
because of other users. Specifically, we call a victim
a user who makes a standard request at some point
in time at which the adversary already knows the (IP,
Location) mapping. Such a user is considered a victim
“once-for-ever” (for the entire sub-interval).
Quantifying the threat in a sub-interval. If at least
one user connected to AP uses an LBS at some time
instant (thus revealing her current location), A obtains
the (IP, Location) mapping based on which it can
locate other users.
We define the compromise time TComp as the first
time within the sub-interval, when a user connected
to AP uses an LBS. If such an event does not occur,
the compromise time is equal to T . At any time, there
are on average NCon users connected to AP, out of
which αLBSNCon potentially make LBS queries. The
aggregated process of LBS requests is a Poisson pro-
cess with intensity ΛLBS = αLBSNConλLBS. Therefore,
the probability that at least one LBS request (from the
aggregated process) is made before time t¯ is
FComp(t¯) = P [TComp < t¯] = 1− e−ΛLBS t¯ ,
and the expected compromise time is 1ΛLBS (1 −
e−ΛLBST ). We call fComp the corresponding probability
density function. The time interval that spans from
the compromise time to the end of the sub-interval
is called the vulnerability window (see Fig. 3) and the
expected value W of its duration is
E [W ] = T − 1− e
−ΛLBST
ΛLBS
. (1)
Fig. 4 depicts the cumulative distribution function
of the compromise time and its average value in an ex-
ample setting5. We observe that, even with moderate
AP popularity and LBS usage, the adversary obtains
the mapping before the DHCP lease expires in 83% of
the cases and he does so after 11 hours on average.
In order to compute the cumulative number of
victims (all the users who made a standard request at
some point in time in the vulnerability window), we
distinguish between two groups of users: those who
were already connected when the first LBS request
was made, e.g., User 6 in Fig. 3, and those who sub-
sequently connected during the vulnerability window
(and are, de facto, victims as they make a standard
request when they connect), e.g., User 7. We call V1
and V2 the number of victims in each group.
There are NCon users connected at the compromise
time (recall that there are on average NCon users
5. Throughout this section, we use different, yet reasonable,
values for the parameters of the model in order to highlight singular
aspects of the threat, e.g., the sensitivity of the different metrics and
the respective contributions of the different parameters.
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Fig. 4. Cumulative distribution function of the compro-
mise time TComp. The parameters were set to λArr = 5
users/h, λDur = 1/1.5 (i.e., average connection time of
one hour and a half), λLBS =0.05 req./h, and αLBS =0.2.
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in the system at any time). Whenever we compute
an expected value involving the number of users
connected, Wald’s equation [17] allows us to consider
that the system is composed of exactly NCon users.
Provided that an LBS request is made, the number of
victims at that time is the number V1 of connected
users who make a standard request before leaving
and before the end of the sub-interval. We compute
the expected value of V1 by applying the law of total
probability, conditioning over both the compromise
time and the time spent in the system. A user connects
at time t ∈ [0, T ] (with a distribution fComp) and stays
connected for a time u ∈ [0,+∞) (with a distribution
fDur). The user is a victim if she makes a standard
request before she disconnects and before the end of
the lease, that is in the interval [t,min(T, t + u)]; this
happens with a probability PStd that depends on the
duration of the interval, i.e., min(u, T − t).
E [V1] = NCon
∫ T
t=0
∫ ∞
u=0
fComp(t)fDur(u)PStd(min(u, T−t))
= NCon
ΛLBSλStd
(λStd + λDur)− ΛLBS ·[
1− e−ΛLBST
ΛLBS
− 1− e
−(λStd+λDur)T
(λStd + λDur)
]
(2)
The average number V2 of users who connect to AP
between the compromise time and the end of the sub-
interval is:
E [V2] = λArr ·E [W ] = λArr
(
T − 1− e
−ΛLBST
ΛLBS
)
. (3)
The average number of victims in a sub-interval is
the expectation of the sum of the number of victims
connected at the compromised time (V1) and victims
arriving within the vulnerability window (V2). This
number has to be compared to the average number
of users who have been connected at some point
within the sub-interval: Vtotal = NCon + λArrT . It can
be observed in Fig. 5 that the proportion of victims
(E [V1]+E [V2])/Vtotal increases with T . This is because
all users who connect during the vulnerability win-
dow are victims. As the probability of the adversary
obtaining the mapping before time T increases with T ,
V1/Vtotal first increases. However, because V1 is upper-
bounded by NCon and Vtotal increases with T , V1/Vtotal
eventually tends to 0. After 24 hours, the location of
more than half of the users is compromised.
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Fig. 5. Cumulative proportion of victims as a function
of time. The parameters were set to: λArr = 5 users/h,
λDur = 1.5, λStd = 10 req./h, λLBS = 0.05 req./h, and
αLBS = 0.2. The dotted curve (resp. dashed) corre-
sponds to the victims connected at (resp. arriving after)
the compromise time. The solid curve represents the
total proportion. Homogeneous (left) / inhomogeneous
(right) Poisson processes for traffic.
Following the same line of reasoning, we can com-
pute the number of victims with respect to the track-
ing attack. In this scenario, we call a victim a user
who made an authenticated request during a DHCP
lease for which the adversary learned – potentially
a posteriori – the (IP,Location mapping). We assume
that a user makes an authenticated request when she
connects to AP (e.g., checking e-mails automatically).
The average number of users who were connected at
the beginning of the lease and subsequently made an
authenticated request before leaving is
E [V ′1 ] = NCon
∫ ∞
u=0
fDur(u)PAuth(min(u, T ))
= NCon
λAuth
(λAuth + λDur)
(1− e−(λAuth+λDur)T )
and the number of users who connected during the
lease (and are de facto victims) is E [V ′2 ] = λArrT . To
obtain the average total number of victims, we add up
these two quantities and condition over the fact that
the adversary obtains the mapping before the end of
the lease, that is E [V ′] = (1−e−ΛLBST )(E [V ′1 ]+E [V ′2 ]).
The proportion of victims is depicted in Fig. 6.
Inferring IP change. We consider two successive
sub-intervals, without loss of generality I0 and I1,
and we look at the linking probability FLink that the
adversary infers the IP change from authenticated
requests (i.e., the probability that the adversary links
two requests based on a common authentication to-
ken, e.g., a cookie). This occurs if at least one user
makes both an authenticated request at most ∆T time
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Fig. 6. Proportion of victims (wrt. the tracking attack)
as a function of the duration of the lease T . The
parameters were set to: λArr = 5 users/h, λDur = 1.5,
λAuth =2 req./h, λLBS =0.05 req./h, and αLBS =0.2. The
dotted curve (resp. dashed) corresponds to the victims
connected at (resp. arriving after) the beginning of the
lease. The solid curve represents the total proportion.
Homogeneous (left) / inhomogeneous (right) Poisson
processes for traffic.
units (∆T < T/2) before the IP change and another
authenticated request at most ∆T time units after the
IP change.
Proceeding similarly as above, we compute the
probability of inferring the IP change by distinguish-
ing between two groups of users: those who were
connected at time T−∆T (see Fig. 7(a)) and those who
connected within [T−∆T, T ] (see Fig. 7(b)). We denote
by P1 (resp. P2) the probability that the adversary
infers the IP change from the authenticated requests
made by a user of the first group (resp. second group).
First consider a user who was already connected at
time T −∆T (there are NCon such users). In order to
infer the IP change from the authenticated requests of
such a user before time t ∈ I1, the following condi-
tions must be satisfied: (i) the user stays connected at
least until time T , (ii) the user makes an authenticated
request between the times T −∆T and T , and (iii) the
user makes an authenticated request, before time t,
and before she leaves (if she leaves before time T+∆T
or until T + ∆T otherwise) (see Fig. 7). We compute
the probability that at least one user (among NCon)
satisfies the above conditions by applying the law of
total probability, conditioning over the time spent in
the system from time T −∆T :
P1(t) = 1− (1− p1(t))NCon , (4)
where
p1(t)=
∫ ∞
u=∆T
fDur(u)PAuth(∆T )PAuth(min(∆T, u−∆T, t−T ))
Only the users that are still connected at time T can
make an authenticated request in the interval [T, T +
∆T ], hence u ranges from ∆T to +∞.
Now consider the users who connect during the
time interval [T −∆T, T ] (see Fig. 7(b)). The number
of such users follows the Poisson process NArr(∆T ).
By applying the law of total probability, conditioning
t
∆T min (∆T, u−∆T )
×
u
User already
connected
|
T
|
T −∆T
|
T +∆T
Auth Auth
(a)
t
T − v min (∆T, v + u− T )
×
uUser connects
Auth Auth
|
T
|
v
|
T −∆T
|
T +∆T
(b)
Fig. 7. Timeline for the two groups of users from
which the adversary can infer the IP change. A user
remains connected for a random time u. (a) The user
is already connected at time T−∆T . For the adversary
to infer the IP change, u needs to be greater than ∆T
and the user must make at least two authenticated
requests: One during the time interval [T − ∆T, T ]
and another one during [T, T + min (∆T, u−∆T )].
(b) The user connects at some time v during the time
interval [T − ∆T, T ]. For the adversary to infer the IP
change, u needs to be greater than T − v (i.e., the
user must still be connected at time T ) and the user
must make at least two authenticated requests: one
during the time interval [v, T ] and another one during
[T, T + min (∆T, v + u− T )].
over the number of such users, their arrival times
(independent of each other and uniformly distributed
within [T−∆T, T ]) and their departure times, we com-
pute the probability that at least one of the newcomers
satisfies the above conditions
P2(t) =
∞∑
n=1
P [NArr(∆T ) = n] · (1− (1− p2(t))n)
= 1− e−λArr∆T ·p2(t) , (5)
where
p2(t) =
∫ T
v=T−∆T
∆T−1
∫ ∞
u=T−v
fDur(u)PAuth(T − v)·
PAuth(min (∆T, v+u−T, t−T ))
Due to space constraints, we do not include the
closed-form expressions of P1 and P2. These can be
easily computed because all integrals are of the form∫ t
u=0
ue−a udu, which is equal to (1− e−a t)/a.
In conclusion, the probability that the adversary
infers the IP change before time t > T , referred to
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as the linking probability, is given by:
FLink(t) = 1− (1− P1(t))(1− P2(t)) .
Note that the above equations can easily be general-
ized to any sub-interval Ik, k ≥ 1, by replacing t− T
(the relative time in I1) by t¯ = t mod T (the relative
time in any sub-interval).
The linking probability can be thought of as a func-
tion of both t and ∆T . Fig. 8 depicts the linking prob-
ability at time T + ∆T as a function of ∆T . It can be
observed that this probability rapidly converges to 1.
The probability P1 (resp. P2) of inferring the IP change
from the users already connected at time T − ∆T
(resp. from the users who connect after time T −∆T
and before the end of the sub-interval) first increases
with ∆T : the probability of generating authenticated
requests increases with the length of the interval. For
large values of ∆T however (typically higher than
the average connection time), P1 decreases. This is
because users connected at time T −∆T are not likely
to still be connected at time T when ∆T is large (com-
pared to the expected connection duration 1/λDur).
Note that the fact that linking probability increases
with ∆T is balanced by the decreased confidence of
the adversary. This is because the probability that
a user makes two authenticated requests from two
distinct APs in the time interval [T −∆T, T + ∆T ]
(moving from one to the other) increases with ∆T .
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Fig. 8. Linking probability at time T + ∆T as a function
of ∆T . The parameters were set to λArr = 5 users/h,
λDur = 1/1.5, λAuth = 2 req./h, and αLBS = 0.2. The
probabilities of the adversary inferring the IP change
based on users connected at time T −∆T i.e., P1, and
based on users connecting in the interval [T −∆T, T ],
i.e., P2, are represented by the dotted and dashed
curves, respectively. The solid curve represents the
total probability of inferring the IP change, i.e., FLink.
Fig. 9 depicts the linking probability as a function
of t. It remains constant for t ≥ T + ∆T because only
authenticated requests made before T + ∆T are taken
into account to infer the IP change. Note that with a
value of ∆T as small as 5 minutes, which provides
high confidence, the adversary can still infer the IP
change with a probability of 43%.
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Fig. 9. Probability of inferring the IP change before
time t > T as a function of t, i.e., FLink(t). The
parameters were set to: λArr = 5 users/h, λDur = 1/1.5,
λLBS =0.05 req./h, ∆T =5 minutes, and αLBS =0.2.
Quantifying the threat over multiple sub-intervals.
When the adversary infers the IP changes, the proba-
bility F (k)Map(t) that the adversary knows the (IP, Loca-
tion) mapping at time t ∈ Ik, k ≥ 1 is
F
(k)
Map(t¯) = FComp(t¯) + (1− FComp(t¯)) · F (k−1)Map (T ) ·
((1− pNew) + pNewFLink(t¯)) (6)
with initial condition F (0)Map(t¯) = FComp(t¯): Either
the adversary obtained the mapping from a LBS re-
quest during the current sub-interval (i.e., FComp(t¯))
or he did not but he obtained the mapping in the
previous sub-interval and either (1) the IP did not
change or (2) he inferred the IP change. Note that
the assumption ∆T < T/2 is required here. Indeed,
this technical restriction ensures that the time interval
[kT − ∆T, kT + ∆T ] (used by the adversary for the
linking), does not overlap with the time interval [(k−
1)T −∆T, (k − 1)T + ∆T ]. Essentially, this makes the
two intervals disjoint hence also independent with re-
spect to the number of authenticated requests, which
allows us to multiply the corresponding probabilities.
From Equation (6), it can be seen that F (k)Map(T ) obeys
the following recursive equation:
F
(k)
Map(T ) = a+ bF
(k−1)
Map (T )
where a = FComp(T ) and b = (1 − FComp(T )) ·
((1− pNew) + pNewFLink(T )). This equation has as a
solution a(1 − bk+1)/(1 − b). As b < 1, F (k)Map(T )
converges to a finite value, i.e., a/(1− b).
The number of victims in the sub-interval Ik can
be computed by replacing the density fComp in Equa-
tions (2) and (3) with the density of F (k)Map. The
probability that the adversary has the mapping (IP,
Location) at time t in sub-interval Ik, i.e., F
(k)
Map is
illustrated in Fig. 10. It can be observed that the
mapping probability increases over time and, after the
convergence, the adversary successfully obtains the
mapping before the lease expires in 79% of the cases
and before the half-lease in 60% of the cases.
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Fig. 10. Probability of obtaining the (IP, Location)
mapping over several sub-intervals. The solid curve
represents the probability of obtaining the mapping
before time t. The dashed curve represents the prob-
ability of obtaining the mapping from an LBS request.
The dotted curve represents the probability of inferring
the IP change. The parameters were set to λArr = 5
users/h, λDur = 1/1.5, λLBS = 0.035 req./h, λAuth = 0.2
req./h, T =24 h, ∆T =3 h, αLBS =0.1, and pNew =1. To
highlight the respective contributions of the linking and
compromise probabilities, some values differ from our
previous setting (e.g., ∆T ). In the first sub-interval, the
linking probability is zero and the probability of having
the mapping is the compromise probability. In subse-
quent sub-intervals, this probability F (k)Map(t) increases
due to the potential inference of IP changes: it is a
combination of FLink(t¯) and FComp(t¯).
Note that in the case of the tracking attack, inferring
IP change can be used to infer the location of users
who connected during the past leases. Assume that
the adversary could not obtain the mapping during a
given lease. If he infers the IP change at the end of
the lease and learns the mapping (from LBS requests)
during the next lease, he can infer a posteriori the
mapping for the previous lease and track all the users
who made authenticated requests during this lease.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we complement our theoretical analy-
sis with experimental results based on traces from a
network of deployed Wi-Fi access points.
Dataset. Our dataset consists of daily user Wi-Fi
session traces, traffic traces and DNS traces for a period
of 23 days in June 2012. To emulate the scenario of
a single popular hotspot and to avoid side effects of
micro-mobility, i.e., devices frequently changing the
AP they are connected to, we aggregate the data of
two APs located close to each other (∼ 15 meters),.
Session traces contain information, obtained from
RADIUS [19] logs, related to users who connect to
the APs. There are three types of RADIUS events:
(i) start: a user is successfully authenticated and
the device is assigned an IP denoting the beginning
of a session; (ii) update: a user connected to the AP
periodically issues a status message; and (iii) stop: a
user disconnects denoting the end of the session. Each
entry in the log contains a timestamp, the device’s
anonymized MAC address, the assigned IP, the ID
of the AP the device is connected to, and an event
type. We observed that users typically begin arriving
around 7:AM. The number of connected users peaks
around 6:PM (136 on average). See diurnal patterns
in the appendix. In total, 4,302 users connected over
the 23 days.
Traffic traces are obtained from the logs at a border
router that connects the network to the Internet. Each
entry in the log contains a timestamp, the source IP,
and the destination (including the IP address and
port). The mapping between a user’s assigned IP
address and her MAC address enables us to correlate
traffic with user session traces.
DNS traces are obtained from the local DNS servers
and each entry in the log contains a timestamp, the
source IP and the requested host name. By using the
source IP, timestamps and requested resources, we are
able to correlate the DNS traces with the traffic traces.
We filtered traffic to a number of Google services
(including e-mail, search, LBS, analytics, advertising)
and classified each request (i.e., standard, LBS, or
authenticated) based on the destination IP, port and
DNS requests. We sanitized the traffic data before-
hand by appropriately grouping traffic traces into
user-service sessions. To do so, we correlated traffic
and DNS requests. This was made possible by the
fact that DNS replies for Google services are cached
for a relatively short time (i.e., TTL of 300 seconds),
and therefore a traffic request is very often preceded
by a DNS request. Consequently, a request accounts
for a user-service interaction, regardless of how much
traffic the interaction generates. The monitored ser-
vices and their classification is presented in Table 1.
Entries of the type service.* refer to all the top-level-
domains observed in the traces (e.g., .com, .fr, .ca).
Entry *.gmail.com includes imap., smtp., pop., www. and
m. and doubleclick.* includes .de and .com. The m. prefix
stands for mobile services.
TABLE 1
Monitored services.
Req. type Services
Std.
www.google.*, pagead2.googlesyndication.com
www.youtube.com, www.google-analytics.com,
doubleclick.*, m.doubleclick.*,
LBS maps.google.*, earth.google.com
Auth. calendar.google.com, *.gmail.com, plus.google.com
Traffic to the monitored services (in terms of the
number of sessions) constitutes about 17% of the
total traffic generated at the AP and 81.3% of users
who connected have accessed at least one of the
services, which shows the tremendous popularity of
Google services. During a day, the average numbers
of standard, authenticated and LBS requests (i.e., user-
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service interactions) to the monitored services are
depicted in Fig. 11. It can be observed that standard
requests are prevalent, followed by authenticated re-
quests. The moderate usage of LBS services can be
explained by the location of the APs: most of the
users visit this area on almost a daily-basis, therefore
the need for location-based information is expected
to be low. In our dataset, 9.5% of users generate LBS
requests.
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Fig. 11. Average number of standard, authenticated,
and LBS requests to the monitored services over a day
(averaged over 23 days).
Results. First, we measure the compromise time and
the proportion of victims, by using the traces from
our dataset. We compare the averaged experimental
results with those from our theoretical analysis and
show them in Fig. 12. For the theoretical analysis,
we use our framework with the parameters extracted
from the real traces: λArr = 14.54 users/h and an
average connection time of 2.17 hours (λDur =1/2.17),
obtained from the session traces; and traffic rates of
λStd =28.3 req./h, λAuth =14.6 req./h and λLBS =0.16
req./h (with αLBS = 0.095), obtained from the traffic
traces. Because the theoretical model assumes a homo-
geneous user arrival rate, we compute the expected
proportion of victims and compromise time as if the
arrival process spanned from 7:30:AM – the time at
which a significant number of users first connect to
the AP in our traces–to 7:PM. It can be observed that
although the model does not capture the time-of-the-
day effects of the user arrival and traffic processes, the
theoretical and experimental expected proportions of
victims match at the end of the day.
We observe that around 8:AM (7:42AM estimated
with our theoretical analysis and 8:25AM with our
experimental results), only 1 hour after users typically
start connecting to the AP, users’ location privacy
is compromised. By the end of the day, about 73%
of the users who connected through the AP were
compromised, out of which 90.5% did not make any
LBS requests (αLBS = 0.095). Note however, that in
terms of the number of users of Google services the
proportion of victims actually corresponds to 90%.
Once the adversary obtains the (IP, Location) map-
ping, it can maintain it over time by relying on
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Fig. 12. Expected proportion of victims. Vertical
lines represent average compromise times: theoretical
TComp = 7:42:AM and experimental TComp = 8:25:AM.
authenticated requests to infer the IP changes upon
DHCP lease expirations, as discussed in Section 4.
Using traces from our dataset, we compute the prob-
ability of the adversary inferring the IP change for
different renewal times during a day, considering the
authenticated requests made at most ∆T minutes
before and after the IP is changed. We consider three
different values, ∆T =1, ∆T =5 and ∆T =10 minutes,
and we show the results in Fig. 13. We assume that
each time the DHCP lease expires the AP is assigned
a new IP address. Even with the smallest inference
time window of 1 minute, the adversary can infer
the IP change with the probability 1.0 between 2:PM
and 5:PM. With higher values of ∆T the time during
which the adversary can infer with probability 1.0 is
even longer, i.e., from 11:AM to 7:PM with ∆T = 10.
However, the adversary’s confidence decreases with
larger ∆T . During the periods where there is less
traffic (e.g., from 11:PM to 6:AM), the probability of
the adversary inferring the mapping is smaller (< 0.2).
Between 5:AM and 6:AM, the adversary cannot infer
the IP change, as there is no traffic.
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Fig. 13. Linking probability (i.e., probability of inferring
the IP change) as a function of the renewal time, for
different inference time window lengths (∆T ).
Consequently, the IP renewal time affects the adver-
sary’s success at maintaining the (IP, Location) map-
ping over time. To confirm the importance of the IP
renewal time and its affect on the adversary’s success,
we plot the cumulative number of victims compro-
mised at the AP during three weeks, depending on
the IP renewal time (Fig. 14). We set ∆T =5 minutes
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and based on the previous findings, we consider the
renewal times at 5:AM, 4:PM and 8:PM, when the
adversary is expected to be least successful, most
successful and moderately successful, respectively. In-
deed, from the results in Fig. 14, we confirm that
the highest number of users (3,545 out of 4,302 total
number of users, which corresponds to virtually all
users who access Google services) is compromised
when the IP renewal happens at 4:PM, followed by
8:PM (3,149 victims). The adversary is least successful
when the IP renewal is at 5:AM (compromising 2,879
users). These results confirm our previous findings.
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Fig. 14. Cumulative number of victims during the whole
experiment, for three different IP renewal times.
6 COUNTERMEASURES
Cryptographic primitives are efficient at protecting
users’ privacy, but because of the way networking
protocols operate, they might not be sufficient, espe-
cially when the private information is the source IP.
Hiding users’ actual source IPs from the destination
(i.e., the adversary) naturally comes to mind as a
straightforward countermeasure against the consid-
ered threat. This can be done in several ways. In relay-
based anonymous communications, a user’s traffic
is forwarded from the source to the destination by
several relay nodes, in such a way that the destina-
tion cannot know the user’s source IP. Examples of
such networks include Tor [20], mix networks [21],
[22], or HTTP proxies. With Virtual Private Networks
(VPN), the user is assigned an IP address that be-
longs to a remote network (e.g., a corporate network
or public/commercial VPNs). To the adversary, the
user’s requests appear to originate from within the
remote network whose location is different from that
of the user. Unfortunately, such techniques are not
widely adopted, especially in the case of mobile com-
munications [23]. Moreover, anonymization networks
have a noticeable price, in terms of usability, speed
and latency, that users are not willing to pay for
privacy [24], [25], [26]. Note also that there are several
techniques for identifying the IP of a client, even
behind a NAT/proxy, e.g., by using a Java applet [27].
Alternatively, these countermeasures can be imple-
mented by ISPs, for instance, by deploying a country-
wide NAT that aggregates traffic from all hosts con-
nected to the ISP at several gateways (e.g., Tele-
fonica [28]) or by IP Mixing [29]. This also applies
to operators of AP networks (e.g., Starbucks, AT&T
Wi-Fi). However, they may not have incentives to
implement such solutions.
Another approach to thwarting the threat consists
in degrading the knowledge of the adversary, by
reducing the accuracy of the reported location and
by increasing the uncertainty about the AP’s loca-
tion. Examples of location privacy enhancing tech-
nologies (PETs) reducing the adversary’s accuracy
include spatial cloaking [30], [31] and adding noise
to reported locations [32]. To increase the adversary’s
uncertainty, [33] proposes to inject “dummy” requests,
i.e., not related to the user’s location. It is not easy
for users to implement these PETs, because some
geolocation requests are implemented in the operating
system that can be controlled by the adversary (e.g.,
Google Android). Moreover, when these techniques
are implemented in a non-coordinated fashion, the ad-
versary might still be able to infer the actual location
by filtering out requests that stand out from the bulk
(increasing its certainty) and averaging the remaining
requests (increasing its accuracy). Better results could
be achieved by having the AP operators implement
the location-privacy preserving mechanisms, but they
might lack incentives to do so.
Finally, as highlighted by our analysis, various
other countermeasures can be implemented by the ISP
or the AP’s owner: reduce the DHCP lease, always
allocate a new IP, trigger the IP change when the
traffic is low (e.g., at 5:AM as suggested by our ex-
perimental results) or purposely impose silent periods
around the renewal time (reducing the chances that
the adversary infers the IP change from authenticated
requests). Unfortunately, all these techniques have a
negative effect on the quality of service and impose a
significant overhead in network management. Thus,
they are unlikely to be deployed in practice. Beyond
technical countermeasures, we envision a “Do-not-
geolocalize” initiative, similar to “Do-not-track”, let-
ting users to opt-out of being localized.
7 DISCUSSION
Scale and implications of the threat. By maintaining
(IP, Location) mappings in the manner we have de-
scribed, an adversary can build an IP-location system
with which he can obtain (at least) sporadic user loca-
tions. For an online service provider whose goal is to
profit from delivering location-targeted information, it
might be sufficient to learn only current user locations
at the time users access services.
However, we can envision a different type of ad-
versary, whose goal is to mount more powerful at-
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tacks on user privacy. In fact, once the adversary
has access to sporadic user-location information, he is
able to reconstruct entire trajectories, produce patterns
of user movement habits, or infer other information
about users, e.g., users’ real identities, interests and
activities. For example, in [34] it is shown how an
adversary that observes each user’s sporadic loca-
tions (that could be noisy and anonymized) can de-
anonymize the users, can compute the probability that
a given user is at a given location at a given time,
and can construct a full trajectory of each user. Golle
and Partridge [35], Beresford and Stajano [36], Hoh et
al. [37], and Krumm [38] use different techniques to
show that users can be identified by inferring where
they spend most of their time (notably their home
and workplace). Our contribution is orthogonal to the
aforementioned pieces of work as we identify and study
a case of sporadic exposure whereas they study the
effect of sporadic exposure on location privacy. In these
cases, the location-privacy threat we identified serves
as a building block for more powerful attacks.
Evolution of the threat with IPv6. IPv6 uses a larger
address space than IPv4, hence fixing IPv4’s addresses
depletion issue. The wide adoption IPv6 could there-
fore lead to the removal of NATs. With IPv6, each host
has a public IP, composed of a prefix (leftmost 64 bits),
shared with other hosts in the same network, and a
unique host part (rightmost 64 bits). Sharing a prefix
is similar to sharing a public IPv4 address behind a
NAT: (IPv4, location) mappings correspond to (prefix,
location) mappings. As IPv6 prefixes are less dynamic
than IPv4 addresses, the threat is amplified.
Business opportunities. Beyond threatening the
location-privacy of users, the (IP, Location) map-
ping technique presented in this paper can be used
as a novel IP-location solution that potentially im-
proves on existing solutions [10], [39]. Online service
providers, such as Google and Microsoft, are in a
position to build and monetize this service by simply
utilizing the user traffic they receive. Additional ad-
vantages of this approach are that it does not require
a dedicated infrastructure or network measurements.
Such a system can be used on its own, or as a comple-
mentary approach to one of the existing ones. Because
ISPs control the IPs assignments and can prevent
service providers from building the mapping (using
the aforementioned countermeasure), they can make a
profit by selling IP locations to service providers (e.g.,
Verizon in the US [40]) – some ISPs sell geographic
information on the topology of their networks [27] –
or by selling privacy-protection services to users.
Legal and Policy Aspects. Because the threat pre-
sented in this papers is based only on a passive anal-
ysis of the received traffic, it does not raise additional
legal or policy issues, compared to what web services
already do, i.e., inferring information from IPs and
mining user traffic to improve the offered services.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a practical threat,
effectively demonstrating that the location privacy
of users connected to access points can be (uninten-
tionally) compromised by others. The scale of the
threat is significant because it simply relies on the
way most networks are designed (i.e., using NAT).
When successful, the service provider locates users
within a few hundreds of meters, i.e., more accurately
than existing IP-location databases. Our theoretical
analysis provides a framework that enables us to
quantify the threat for any access-point setting and
to identify the key parameters and their effect on the
adversary’s success. This framework serves as a light-
weight alternative to an extensive traffic analysis for
estimating the threat. We experimentally investigate
the state in practice, by analyzing real traces (collected
from deployed Wi-Fi access points) of users of Google
services. We observe the large scale of the threat, even
with a modest use of LBS services. We survey possible
countermeasures and we find that adequate ones can
be used to protect users’ location privacy. However,
they need to be widely deployed.
We intend to further study this threat by focusing
on the following aspects: (i) the accuracy of a IP-
location service, based on (IP, Location) mappings,
in particular the adversary’s inference of the AP’s
precise location based on all the LBS requests it re-
ceives (in this paper, we assumed that the adversary
learns the mapping as soon as he receives one LBS
request), (ii) the adversary’s inference of IP changes,
taking into account e.g., fingerprinting users, and the
trade-off between the probability of inferring the IP
change and the adversary’s confidence, and (iii) the
evolution of the threat for mobile users, in particular
the adversary’s ability to track users as they move and
connect to different APs..
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APPENDIX A
NOTATIONS
TABLE 2
Table of notations.
Symbol Definition
T DHCP lease time
pNew Probability of being assigned a new IP
Ik k-th sub-interval
t¯ Relative time within a sub-interval
λArr Rate of user arrivals at AP
NArr(t) Number of arrivals in an interval of length t
TDur Time users stay connected to the AP
1/λDur Avg. time users stay connected to the AP
FDur, fDur Pdf/cdf of TDur
NCon Avg. number of users connected to the AP
λStd, λAuth Rates of user std./auth. requests
PStd(t),PAuth(t) Probability that a user makes at least one
request during an interval of length t
αLBS Proportion of users who make LBS requests
λLBS Rate of user LBS requests
ΛLBS Aggregated rate of users’ LBS requests
TComp First time an LBS request occurs
FComp, fComp Pdf/cdf of TComp
W Length of the vulnerability window
∆T Time interval used to infer IP changes
FLink(t) Probability of knowing IP change at time t
F
(k)
Map(t) Probability of having the mapping before
time t ∈ Ik
APPENDIX B
DATASET STATISTICS
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Fig. 15. Average number of users connected to the AP
over a day (averaged over the 23 days).
